Assorted links
0 comments- Most influential Ukrainians, you won't be surprised. [Kyiv Post]
- From all I've read on Yatsenuik this is the first one that compares him to Khodorkovsky.[Moscow Times]
- Another article that asks what many others have asked about Crimea. [NY Times]
- Shevchenko returns to his old club, Dynamo Kyiv. [Guardian]
Comparing Events: Moldova vs. Ukraine
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An article in OpenDemocracy by Louis O'Neal discusses the pitfalls that befell Ukraine and the lessons Moldova's new four party alliance can take from it.
However, comparison of the two can only go so far, Regions hasn't dominated in the same manner the Moldovan Communists have dominated politics this past decade. The problems in the "Orange" coalition was partly self-induced and thankfully the Rada doesn't elect the president.
This is because Moldova elects its president indirectly, in parliament, by a super-majority of 61 out of 101 seats. Despite the opposition's legitimate and much-vaunted "victory," the Communists remain by far the country's single most popular party. Controlling nearly half the seats in the legislature (48 to the united opposition's 53), they can block any presidential candidate they wish. On top of this, Voronin is still currently acting president and the Moldovan constitution, twisted with contradictions, fails to spell out clearly when he must relinquish the post in the absence of a new, duly-elected chief executive.
Perilously, this little country's complex electoral legislation allows
only two relatively quick bites at the apple to elect a president; if
none emerges, parliament must once more be dissolved. The rub is that
the Moldovan constitution permits only one dissolution of parliament
per year, and that has already happened in 2009.
Thus, bar a deal on a grand coalition or a neutral president
acceptable to all, Voronin will argue that he remains acting president
until a new, elected president is sworn in. The opposition will say
that the new speaker of parliament (whom it will select quite soon with
its simple majority) should, by succession in the absence of a
full-fledged president, become the country's acting head. Both
arguments have support in law, and so it may fall to the constitutional
court - notoriously friendly to the Communists - to decide who will be
Moldova's leader until next year.
Another article on the coalition negotiations in Moldova show that the Communists aren't interested in working with the new Alliance for European Integration. They see a chance to form a coalition with one of the factions in the alliance. Now for a Ukraine-like scenario to play itself in Moldova, the Communists need successsfully to pull one of the factions and elect a president.
Democratic Party Chairman Marian Lupu has refuted rumors that his or his party would have any separate deals with the communists. On Monday, some online websites posted articles that the Communists are allegedly ready to vote for him as candidate for the Moldovan presidency provided he agrees to stand for the post as the candidate of the left-centrist coalition.
Lupu stated to Stirea Zilei portal that rumors are but an attempt to weaken the Alliance for European Integration."Apparently, the Communists proceed from the idea, being lately disseminated so massively, that Marian Lupu allegedly dreams to become President of Moldova by hook or by crook. I repeat I have never had an obsession to become the head of state", Lupu said.
Just a rumor, but the alliance just came into existence and as the Orange coalition showed, factions united against a common enemy can break down. The alliance managed to elect a speaker, but now comes the tough part.
EDM's (Volume 6, Issue 148) Vladimir Socor offers three scenarios that Moldova could face as the factions in Parliament vie for power. As scenario three indicates, the likelihood of the new alliance staying together isn't very good. Also like Regions in Ukraine, the Communists could benefit from being in opposition, even though its unclear why autumn is thought to be when the economic crisis will hit"full force".
3. Temporary abdication of the Communist Party from power. The
party leadership warns, or bluffs, that it may go into opposition
(Moldpres, July 30-August 1). In that event, a government could
theoretically be formed by an alliance of four parties: the
Liberal, Liberal-Democrat, Democratic, and Our Moldova, adding up
to 53 seats in the parliament. However, these parties' differences
of outlook and interests would make it very unlikely and perhaps
impossible to create and maintain such an alliance. The Liberal
Party's close ties with Bucharest and its confrontational style
would pose additional problems. This party does not aim to govern,
but rather to gather strength as the main opposition (and sole
"right-wing") force. Meanwhile, the communist leadership feels
tempted to go into opposition before the economic crisis hits
Moldova with full force by the fall. In that case, a non-communist
government could soon be brought down by the economic crisis and
powerful communist opposition, even before the post-communist
transition could start in earnest.
Presidential Election: Ill willl
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Recently, Yulia Tymoshenko called for a united front against Yanukovych. A somewhat self-serving gesture considering she's been running behind him in polls. The optimism of 2004 isn't there, Tymoshenko can't expect Yushchenko or Yatsenuik to abandon their bids for the sake of unity. What benefit does she see in working with Yushchenko? Perhaps access to presidential administrative resources, even though the budget code changes BYuT supported may strengthen her hand.
Neverthenless, as a recent article in VOA points out on post-Orange Revolution politics, whatever goodwill generated from those events has faded from the minds of voters (and politicians)
The Rada overriding a veto by Yushchenko shows why unity seems unlikely. Meanwhile, Yushchenko interests in amending the constitution persists.His party wants to drum up support for the the new draft legislation. Lytvyn has come out against holding discussion on these amendments.
Neverthenless, as a recent article in VOA points out on post-Orange Revolution politics, whatever goodwill generated from those events has faded from the minds of voters (and politicians)
But Antonenko and other experts, such as Robert Legvold of Columbia University, say this pluralism brought about bitter political fights between President Yushchenko and his former "Orange Revolution" ally, now Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko - squabbling that continues to this day.
"And that has produced not only a stalemate, political stalemate and an inability to make progress between the executive branch and the parliament, but a kind of poisonous, petty political competition among leaders that has alienated the public at large, which is for the most part very unsatisfied with all of the major political leaders in Ukraine. And that makes it very difficult for the government, even if it were to get its act together, to mobilize the population behind it," Legvold said.The article later points out how the economic recession in Ukraine has further damaged the president's approval ratings, sending it into the low single digits. Tymoshenko's ratings have also suffered , while Yanukovych has watched from the wings has the two have grappled with the problems spawned by the crisis.
David Marples, with the University of Alberta, says given all of Ukraine's problems, Mr. Yushchenko's approval rating is at an all time low. But that hasn't prevented him from becoming a candidate in January's presidential election. "His popularity is probably the lowest of any politician in Europe right now at around two percent. And it almost seems like he's oblivious to the problems that have been created - he's not addressing them. I read a speech of his quite recently where he was summarizing his years in office in order to justify running again, which of course he has decided to do. And he claimed that he had a good record and that he should be proud of his record. And I really wondered what there is to be proud of? Because in every particular area, it seems to have been a failure. And probably even more importantly, perceived as a failure by the population," he said.
The president seems to be in terminal self-denial, yet insists on behaving as if the the last five years have been rosy. Why would he consider Tymoshenko's suggestion, as noted in the excerpt above, he's acting like he's been a success not a failure.
Independence Day: How its observed
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Independence Day (18th) in Ukraine must include a letter (Ukrainian) to the people from the president, probably his last one and the prime minister (English). No sense in highlighting any passages from the letters, typical pleasantries and platitudes expected on this day. As part of the tradition there is also the Kyiv military parade, here's Ukr Pravda with pictures.
Assorted links
0 comments- Ukraine may be hedging itself against another "dispute" with Russia/Gazprom.[Jamestown Blog]
- A profile of the Mayor of Kyiv. [NY Times]
- Swedbank banking woes. [FT Alphaville]
- Review of Paul Kubicek's article on post-Orange Revolution Ukraine. [via]
- Tymoshenko and Putin may meet in Poland. [Interfax]
- I'll believe it when I see it. Rumor, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych to share power post-Election. [Kyiv Post]
Econmy: Growth, Inflation, and the Hyrvnia
0 commentsUkraine's economy shrank by 18% in the second quarter and NBU adviser, Valeriy Lytvytsky, forecasts a 10% contraction, a slightly better forecast than the IMF and World Bank forecasts.
Bad economic news, but the Government and President are both complaining about the hryvnia's recent drop. Even though the economic situation is still grim, the president doesn't think there is a reason why the hryvnia should be dropping.
"There are currently no factors that may have a negative effect on the stability of the hryvnia exchange rate, apart from the one - an uncontrollable budget deficit. But this question can be easily resolved - either with the participation of the National Bank or without it, and through the support of a weak or strict budget policy in Ukraine," he said at a meeting with National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) Governor Volodymyr Stelmakh on Tuesday. Yuschenko expressed concern that the NBU was the only customer of sovereign bonds and that UAH 36 billion had been spent for this goal.
"Your task is stable money. This is the only mission of the National Bank. There are no factors in Ukraine influencing the hryvnia's stability," he said.
Bank Crisis: Possible Bank Fraud
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Now that the bank crisis has possibly subsided, Ukraine's government is now looking into embezzlement of NBU money that was supposed to be used for refinancing banks. Rodovid Bank is at the center of a 2 billion hryvnia scheme, reports the Kyiv Post. The scheme involved several dummy companies using the same plot of land as collateral in order to get access to bank credit.
As he put it, a limited-liability company in November 2007 secured a credit line at the bank with a 113-hectare land plot in Ozerna Street in Kyiv put up as collateral. Fifteen more companies received loans worth UAH 1.750 billion on security of the same plot of land.
Lutsenko said that in 2008 the same land was transferred to Kyiv-based Clearing House Bank for mortgage. After which, the minister said, it was put up as collateral for getting NBU refinancing worth UAH 1.260 billion.
Later on, he said, all the limited-liability companies, which received loans from Rodovid Bank, went bankrupt. Checks being held by the Interior Ministry have revealed that most of the companies were bogus ones.
The Interior Minister suggests that all the funds illegally obtained at the above-mentioned banks could be used by one of the candidates running for presidency at the 2010 election.
Presidential Election: Yatseniuk has something to say
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Arsen Yatseniuk has been busy working on his image as a moderate and pragmatic leader. His commented on the financial crisis and the need to avoid populism in politics. He also had something to say on the Ukrainian public health system There was also this statement on the mayor of Uzhgorod , which allowed him to express his thoughts on racism and xenophobia. An appropriate response for someone interesting in taking the centrist vote in the presidential election. Over at the Kyiv Post, this article looks at Yatsenuik's weak support among young Ukrainian voters, but also his weak polling numbers. The former speaker of the Rada hasn't managed to overtake the two major candidates, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, his also failed to catch the interest of the youth vote. The article doesn't focus on the statements his making. However, it does touch on his motivation.
"I have already applied to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Interior Ministry, the Security Service. Ukraine is a multinational, multicultural and multiconfessional state. Only realizing this one can save the country," the address reads.
He also addressed all political parties, NGOs and citizens of Ukraine: "Let's take a stand against xenophobia, racism and Nazism. Let's address the Prosecutor General's Office demanding the opening the case against Ratushniak for inciting ethnic hatred."
“Yatseniuk has stopped rising in polls and if he doesn’t present a concrete program and show who is in his team, he will lose votes of youth supporting him in favor of Tymoshenko,” said political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko.
Political analyst Taras Berezovets said the “youth are the most critical group of voters” if they decide to show up, but have shown themselves to be traditionally “less active, often not coming to the polls at all.”
“Turnout will be important in these elections,” said Fesenko, adding that the traditional 2004 Orange Revolution electorate is packed with youth and is seen as leaning towards either Tymoshenko or Yatseniuk. If they are less active because of their disgust with all the rivalries within the Orange camp, “then this will play into the hands of Yanukovych,” whose party has a tradition of rallying up its voter base in big elections, Fesenko said.
Asked why Yatseniuk has failed to rally young voters, Fesenko blaimed the candidate’s inability to present a clear-cut program and team. “If he thinks that youth will support him for no particular reason, just because he too is young, this is his big mistake,” Fesenko said.
EU: Slovakia to Hungary as Ukraine to Russia?
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A party representing the Hungarian minority is mounting a challenge in the constitutional court: it calls the law “19th-century language imperialism”. The Slovak response similarly accuses the Hungarians of hankering for the 19th century: they dominated the region in the Habsburg era. The Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, said the real problem was those wanting to bully Slovaks in the south of the country into learning Hungarian.
This excerpt from an article in The Economist on a new law in Slovakia that fines people that do not promote Slovak in public. A reminder that language disputes don't just happen in Ukraine, but can happen in the heart of the European Union.
Assorted links
0 comments- NY Times has a good article summing up the different problems that Ukraine has faced since being named co-host of the 2012 Euro.
- One expert calls bottom for Ukraine's economy. [Kyiv Post]
- Moldova has a board game that asks the eternal question, "Where is Moldova?".[RFE]
- Codel pays a visit to Ukraine.
- Pretty amazing sand based artwork. [Guardian]
- Hryvnia still depreciating against the dollar.
Religion & Politics: Patriarch's recent visit
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Perhaps Medvedev's letter was the start of Russian intervention in the next election, but a recent religious visit by the Russian Patriarch demonstrated another aspect of this intervention: cultural and spiritual. The recent visit by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill was an implicit political maneuver dressed up as a religious visit. A Eurasia Daily Monitor (V.6, Issue 155) article on the visit noted the emphasis on spiritual closeness and common history between Ukrainians and Russians by the patriarch. An old move by Russia to de-emphasize an independent and separate Ukrainian identity.
.... In line with Moscow's official rhetoric, Kirill spoke a lot
about the common roots of Russia and Ukraine dating back to the
medieval Kyiv Rus. One of his chief ideologists, Andrey Kuraev, was
more outspoken, threatening Ukraine with a civil war should a
single church fully independent from Moscow ever be established
(Ekho Moskvy, July 27).
Demonstrating that he views Ukraine as part ofUnfortunately, as this slide-show from RFE shows, some Ukrainian nationalists showed up looking and acting like neo-fascists. While in another RFE article, the fuzzy line between politics and religion that Patriarch Kirill holds is noted.
the Russian space, Kirill ostentatiously refused to discuss local
Ukrainian issues at the first ever sitting of the Russian synod in
Kyiv. At the same time, he reported on a recent meeting of Russian
religious leaders with President Dmitry Medvedev (UNIAN, July 27).
Immediately on returning from Kyiv, Kirill met Medvedev to tell him
that the "spiritual unity" existing between Russia and Ukraine "for
millennia" "became a basic value that is not affected by political
considerations" (Interfax-Ukraine, August 6).
Speaking on Ukrainian television on July 28, Kirill said Russians and Ukrainians were one and the same people and called on them not to sacrifice their values in the pursuit of closer ties with Europe -- a veiled jab at Ukrainian efforts to move away from Russia's orbit and join NATO.
The patriarch also parroted a imperialist message, even while rejecting the notion of imperialism by the Orthodox Church , in response to Yushchenko's wish for an independent Ukrainian church.
"This Church already exists, Mr. President. It is the local Church of Ukraine, and if it did not exist, Ukraine would not exist today," Kirill hit back. "There is no imperialism here, no domination over others. There is only a clear Orthodox doctrine: the patriarch is everyone's father, regardless of the color of passports in people's pockets or the state in which they live."
The patriarch went on to describe Kyiv as the "southern capital of Russian Orthodoxy," and dismissed Ukraine's breakaway churches as "wounds" on the body of the Russian Orthodox Church
Neighbors: Medvedev talks to Ukraine
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President Dmitry Medvedev has decided to that its time for Russia to start using its "soft power" by criticizing President Yushchenko through a video blog and open letter. The Russian president has sharp words for a president that probably won't even break 10% in the next presidential election. A Reuters piece as a curious sentence in its piece on the open letter to Yushchenko from Medvedev.
In an open letter to Ukraine's pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko, Medvedev said he would postpone sending a new ambassador to Kiev, and accused Yushchenko of putting gas supplies to Europe at risk by disrupting ties with Moscow.
Ukraine, a former Soviet republic whose population is divided between pro-Western and Russia-leaning camps, elects a new president in January to succeed Yushchenko, swept to power in the 2004 Orange Revolution.Medvdev accusing Yushchenko of jeopardizing gas supplies isn't news, but I did find it interesting that the Reuters story explicitly acknowledges that Yushchenko will be replaced. No suggestion that he will win a second term.
But, why attack a president whose poll numbers are low and not go after Tymoshenko? Perhaps because the president represents a better symbolic villain for Russia rather than Tymoshenko. His a figure still identified with the popular protests in 2004 even if his term in office has been disappointing. However, unlike Putin in 2004 there is no explicit support for a particular candidate, but there is a lot of crypto-messaging going in the letter. As Lytvyn points out, Medvedev's statements will be a boon to certain candidates.This also won't be the last thing that Russia does in order to influence the Ukrainian presidential election.
Assorted links
0 comments- The search for ex-BYuT deputy Viktor Lozinsky,added to Interpol list. [Ukrainian News]
- Arsen Yatsenuik has a favorable impression of Putin. [Taras Kuzio]
- Deputy head of NBU defends the current value of the hryvnia. [Kyiv Post]
- Gas reforms in return for loans for gas deliveries to Ukraine. [Moscow Times]
Crimea: It's August
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From EDM (V.6, Issue 147), Taras Kuzio notes the current tension in Crimea with the Ukrainian side planning on expelling the Russian Consul General. Its described as a new diplomatic war between the two countries. While discussing the recent events in Crimea, he examines the reasoning behind the new toughness in Kyiv.
Den also explores the implications of having the Russian fleet based in Crimea, including the fear of a another August conflict. Ukraine wants to prevent any military dispute from erupting this month.
The "rocket-diplomatic war," as Ukrayinska Pravda (July 24) described it, is a new phenomenon, as the current Ukrainian leadership has opted to force the fleet to adhere to every aspect of the 1997 agreement. One factor influencing President Yushchenko to adopt this policy is the shock in Kyiv over the use of fleet to attack Georgia in August 2008. Ukraine had not expected that its territory would be used to launch any aggression against an ally. The missiles illegally transported through Sevastopol were the same type used against the Georgian navy during the Russian aggression against Georgia.
On the eve of the fleet's annual parade attempts to hold a rehearsal were also blocked by the Ukrainian interior ministry due to the lack of permits for 22 Russian armoured personnel carriers to trundle through Sevastopol. One Russian diplomatic source described this as another "provocation" (Ukrayinska Pravda, July 23).
Den also explores the implications of having the Russian fleet based in Crimea, including the fear of a another August conflict. Ukraine wants to prevent any military dispute from erupting this month.
This year’s military exercises cause concern among Ukraine’s political analysts, as did last year’s war in Georgia. Some believe that there is a threat of Russian army’s repeated invasion of Georgia for the purpose of getting control over the strategically important oil pipeline. Others fear that the Crimea is in for a replay of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz scenario; that the Kremlin may come up with legal grounds for taking the Crimea away from Ukraine.
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