Blue &Yellow: Politics and Economics in Ukraine

The negative effects have included a more restrictive environment for the media, selective prosecution of opposition figures, worrisome instances of intrusiveness by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), widely criticized local elections in October 2010, a pliant parliament (Verkhovna Rada), and an erosion of basic freedoms of assembly and speech. Corruption remains a huge drain on the country,and there is significant room for the situation to get even worse.

From a Freedom House evaluation on Ukraine. Its not too long a read, but let me present some excerpts from the report below.

Elections & Reform

But credible observers in Ukraine are now concerned that his administration is acting to alter the electoral environment in ways that will prejudice the political prospects of independent and opposition forces and help to concentrate power in the hands of the ruling party, both in Kyiv and in the regions. These concerns center on three interrelated issues: a new electoral code, currently in preparation; the conduct of the 2010 local elections; and constitutional reform.

Political Persecution

Nonetheless, the government’s anticorruption campaign lacks credibility. Authorities point to the prosecution of former prime minister Tymoshenko and former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko as a signal that corruption will not be tolerated and that politicians are not above the law. However, these cases are not focused on charges of personal enrichment, but rather on administrative abuses. The government is correct that the prosecutions send a strong signal, but that signal is actually a warning to other would be opposition figures not to challenge the authorities. 

Constitutional Reform

The Constitutional Court’s September 2010 decision to invalidate the 2004 constitutional amendments associated with the Orange Revolution raised both substantive and procedural red flags. Substantively, the ruling shifted power from the parliament back to the presidency, granting Yanukovych the same level of authority wielded by former president Kuchma. Moreover, in the run-up to the decision, four judges who opposed the nullification of the amendments resigned and were replaced with judges who backed it. The subsequent formation of a Constituent Assembly under the auspices of the president has hardly inspired confidence in future constitutional checks and balances. There were also concerns that the arrest of the son-in-law of the Constitutional Court’s chairman, combined with a criminal case against his daughter, represented a not-so-subtle form of  pressure on the court.

On a future virtual presidential candidate 

Many of the observers we heard from expressed fear that this strategy—disqualifying the opposition party best able to challenge the Party of Regions while facilitating the growth of a more extreme nationalist party—may be replicated on a national level. These observers point out that in the presidential election, which came after Tymoshenko had presided over a massive economic collapse and extraordinary divisions with the incumbent president, she lost to Yanukovych by just 3.48 percentage points. To ensure Yanukovych’s reelection, they argue, the Party of Regions is intent on having him faceoff against a fringe Ukrainian nationalist candidate, knowing that this will depress opposition turnout in the center and energize Yanukovych’s base in the east and south.